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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DALE BERKELEY WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 7969 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
Dale Berkeley Wilson, plaintiff, filed suit against the 
defendant, Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd, asking damages for aliena-
tion of Wilson's wife's affections in the sum ·of $75,000.00 
compensatory damages and $25;000 punitive damages. Dr. 
Oldroyd filed a counter-claim for slander asking damages in 
the amount of $110,000.00 plus $719.00 for medical services 
allegedly rendered . by Dr. Oldroyd to the plaintiff and his 
family. After an extended trial, the jury ~eturned the verdict 
awarding damages to Wilson in the amount of $50,000.00 
compensatory damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages. They 
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returned a verdict of no cause of action on Dr. Oldroyd's 
counter-claim for slander, but awarded the full amount claimed, 
$719.00, on the counterclai~ for medical services rendered. A 
motion for a new trial was filed by the defendant and denied 
by the trial court. This appeal is taken from the verdict of 
the jury on the alienation of affection case. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Dr. Merrill L. Oldroyd is a physician and surgeon residing 
at Payson, Utah where he has been practicing his profession 
since July 1, 1934. Dr. Oldroyd is married and was then and 
now is residing with his wife and two minor sons in Payson. 
The plaintiff, Dale Wilson, and his wife, Geraldine Wil-
son were married June 4, 1939 at Reno, Nevada. After living 
for a period in Salt Lake City, Utah and San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, they moved to Payson, Utah in the spring of 1940. 
Mrs. Wilson was a nurse by profession. She worked for many 
years at the Payson Hospital where Dr. Oldroyd was a member 
of the staff. The evidence as to the relationship between Dr. 
Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson comes almost· entirely from testi-
mony given by Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson and from a letter 
introduced in evidence which was mailed by Dr. Oldroyd to 
Mrs. Wilson and removed from the United States mails by 
the plaintiff, Dale Wilson. It is evident from the testimony 
of Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson and from this letter that 
an infatuation developed between Dr. Oldroyq and Mrs. 
Wilson. Dr. Oldroyd testified that he kissed Mrs. Wilson 
and told her that he loved her on the evening of December 
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6, 1950 when, at her request, he drove her home from work 
at the hospital. Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs .. Wilson also testified 
that they had kissed each other on a nun1ber of occasions after 
that and that they had expressed to each other on a number of 
other occasions at a later date sentiments of mutual love and 
affection. There is np evid~.Qce in the r~cord or even an inti-
. f h k!tJ 1/?__itf.( . . . . 
matton rom t e ;aeteftua:nt that there was at any time any 
immoral conduct ·b~tween Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson .. 
On or about the 20th day of January 1951, Mrs~ Wilson 
left her husband and went to Riverside, Cali.fornia to the 
home of her father, who was a practicing physician. Immedia-
tely after Mrs. Wilson left, Dr. Oldroyd wrote Mrs. Wilson 
a rather affectionate letter which was secured by Dale Wilsol?-
from the United States mails. Dale Wilson then confronted 
Dr. Oldroyd and Dr. Oldroyd's wife with the letter in ques-
tion. The Doctor admitted an affection for Mrs. Wilson but 
expressed his regret that the situation between the Wilsons 
had come to the state where Mrs. Wilson was leaving her 
husband. Wilson then asked Dr. Oldroyd if the doctor would 
write a. letter to Mrs. Wilson urging her to return to· her-
husband. The doctor wrote this letter and in response to 
this urging and the urging from her father, Mrs. Wilson did 
return to her husband at her home in Payson abo'ut the 28th 
or 29th of January, 1951. Dr. Oldroyd then talked to both 
of the Wilsons jointly urging them to patch up their differences 
and to resume their relationship as husband and wife. Never 
after that, except on one occasion on the 31st day of January 
Wh~n Dale Wilson himself brought his wife to Dr. Oldroyd's 
office, does the evidence indicate that Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. 
Wilson were ever alone in each other's company. 
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The situation between the Wilsons, however, did not 
improve in the succeeding month and on at laest two occasions 
Mr. Wilson physically abused Mrs. Wilson, once by hitting 
her with his hand and on another occasion by slamming an 
oven door on her hand causing a rather painful injury. In 
March of 1951, Mrs. Wilson again left and taking her two 
children with her, went to the home of her father in Riverside, 
California where she has continued to reside to this time. 
In July of 1951 Mrs. Wilson filed suit for divorce against 
her husband. Mr. Wilson counterclaimed asking for a divorce 
on his own account. After a trial. in which all of the evidence 
as to Mr. Wilson's abuse of his wife and evidence as to Mrs. 
Wilson's relationship with Dr. Oldroyd was introduced, the 
court awarded Mrs. Wilson the divorce, awarded her custody 
of the children and alimony and support money in the amount 
of $150.00 per month. 
As to the facts related to this point, there is no conflict 
in the evidence, either the parties are in agreement as to their 
testimony or the testimony of one side or the other stands 
uncontradicted. The principle dispute in the evidence in the 
case is as to the nature of the relationship between Dale Wilson 
and Geraldine Wilson prior to the time that any act occurred 
on the part of Dr. Oldroyd which could possibly have had 
any effect of alienating Mrs. Wilson's affections from her 
husband. 
Dale Wilson, on direct examination, testified generally 
that during all of their married life he and his wife had lived 
in connubial bliss, unmarred by any incident which would in-
dicate that she did not have the greatest affection for him. He 
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further testified that until the infatuation developed between 
Dr. Oldroyd and his wife hat there was never any indication 
on his wife's part that all of her love and affection did not 
belong to him. He .further testified as to his great sorrow and 
distress at losing his wife, and placed the full. blame on Dr. 
Oldroyd for what had occurred. 
On cross-examination, however, Dale Wilson admitted 
that in November, a month before there is any evidence of 
any association between Dr. Oldroyd and Mrs. Wilson, that 
he was aware that his wife was attempting to attract Dr. Old-
royd's attention. He testified that Dr. Oldroyd would go by the 
Wilson home at a certain time each day on his way to his farm 
and that on such occasions Mrs. Wilson would dress up, put 
a ribbon in her hair, and go out into the yard and wait for 
the doctor to pass. He further testified that on one occasion, 
sometime prior to December, he was suspicious of his wife's 
interest in Dr. Oldroyd, when one day on the streets of Payson 
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson had s~en Dr. Oldroyd dozing in his 
automobile and Mrs. Wilson became rather concerned for 
fear that he was ill. He further admitted on cross-examination 
that early in the year of 1950, months before any association 
had occurred between Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Oldroyd that he, 
Wilson, had accused his wife of improper conduct with a Dr. 
Steele, who is also at the Payson Hospital. 
In regard to his injured feelings, he admitted on cross-
examination that on or about the 25th day of January, after 
he had removed the letter from the mails he had discussed 
the letter with his cousin, Lee Nebeker, attorney at law, and . 
had stated in effect that he didn't care about Geraldine leaving 
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him, but that he would like to get $10,000 or $15,000 from 
the doctor for his children and that such amount would not 
hurt the doctor. He further admitted that by the time the 
divorce action between himself and Mrs. Wilson came up 
that his injured feelings were sufficiently healed that he was 
keeping company, rather regularly, with a Miss Phyllis Arm-
strong. 
Geraldine Wilson's testimony, on the other hand, is a 
recital of numerous and continual offenses against her b~ 
husband which had completely ·destroyeq any love or affection 
she might have had for him long before she had any more than 
a passing acquaintance with Dr. Oldroyd. She· testified that 
from the beginning of their married life, Dale Wilson was 
cold and indifferent toward her and related numerous specific 
instances where on social occasions he had completely ignored 
her and allowed her to go home by herself or with other men 
who were willing to see her safely home when her husband 
refused to do so. 
She told of her husband's irresponsibility in financial 
matters, how he had ·never provided her with the comforts 
of life, had compelled her to live in an old family home without 
modern conveniences and how she herself had been forced to 
·go to work in order to earn money to keep up the family. She 
testified further that they had discussed the matter of getting 
a divorce in 1943. In 1947, three years before there is any 
evidence of any act of Dr. Oldroyd in regard to Mrs. Wilson, 
she left her husband and went to the home of her father in-
tending to secure a divorce, but was persuaded by her father 
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to return to Mr. Wilson and attempt to establish a home for 
the sake of her children. 
She further testified that she went to ·California in 191,1 
and 1959 for periods of time, principally for the purpose of 
getting away from her husband. She told of the accusations 
made against her by her husband in regard . to Dr. Steele which 
have been referred to above. She was prevented by the Court 
from testifying as to many things said and. done by her hus-
band on the grounds that such testimony was incompetent 
under the rule of privilege communications. These matters, 
as well as other matters of evidence, will be more fully dis-
cussed later in the brief in connection with the Assignments 
of Error to which such matters are relevant. 
Mrs. Wilson testified that before she knew Dr. Oldroyd 
more than casually all affection which . she had for her hus-
band had been destroyed and that she disliked him so badly 
that she ((couldn't stand the sight of him." 
Dr. Oldroyd testified, which testimony was uncontradicted, 
that in September of 1950, months before he had more than 
a professional interest in Mrs. Wilson she had asked him to 
allow her to accompany him on a trip to Zion's Canyon, but 
had then declined to·go on being informed that Mrs. Oldroyd 
was going on the trip. · 
On the theory that such evidence was competent .as going 
to the question of punitive damages, the Judge allowed evi-
dence to ·be introduced as to the financial wealth of Dr. Old-
royd. These matters and other matters of evidence will be. 
more fully discussed later in the brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A. MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT AND IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OVER 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SAID COMPLAINT 
FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTI-
TUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
POINT TWO 
THE VERDICT IS SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO 
APPEAR· TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON 
SUCH GROUNDS. 
POINT THREE 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A VER-
DICT OF ANY KIND· AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN PL}dN-,.Y. 
UFF'S FAVOR AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW 
r 
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS 
AGAINST THE EVIDEN~ ~ ~ 'f/ 
't,c.cc.,., • .;A ~ 10 ~~·•··••' '+JP~ .. J-~. 
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POINT FOUR 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICE, WILFUL-
NESS OR WANTONNESS ON THE PART OF THE DE-
FENDANT TO JUSTIFY -THE SUBMISSION OF THE 
QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE. JURY. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE FINANCIAL 
\ 
WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED ON INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS: 
(a) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTIONS 
. ( 
NUMBERED 4, 5, 6, and 7 THAT THEY SHOULD 
FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THEY FOUND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT PERSUADED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE TO DESERT OR LEAVE THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
(b) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 6 THAT THE LAW PRESUMES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN 
MAN AND WIFE. 
11 
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• 
(c). IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES. 
POINT SEVEN 
. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND EX-
CLUDING EVIDENCE IN THE FOLLOWING PARTI-
CULARS: 
(a) IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF GERJ\LDINE 
WILSON REGARDING EVENTS AND OCCUR-
' RENCES DURING HER MARRIED LIFE WITH 
THE PLAINTIFF, DALE WILSON. 
(b) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE TESTI-
MONY GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE ACTION AND AT THE 
TAKING OF HER DEPOSITION. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT AND IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY OVER 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION THAT SAID COMPLAINT 
FAILS TO SET FORTH FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTI-
TUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
12 
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It is our position that the complaint filed in this cause 
fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cl~im against 
defendant. The allegation of plaintiff's complaint are mere 
legal conclusions. We believe that a special demurrer to the 
complaint under our former pleading should have been sus-
tained. We believe the motion for a more definite statement 
and the motion to dismiss should have been sustained in this 
case. We wish to call the court's attention to the fact that 
an intermedaite appeal was taken by defendant upon the court's 
ruling denying our motions. 
We have searched in vain to find a reported case or a 
suggested form in which a complaint for alienation of affection . 
is pleaded as plaintiff. has pleaded in this case. All of the sug-
g~sted forms contain allegations of ultimate facts in additio~ 
to the legal conclusion ((alienated the affections of plaintiff's 
wife.'' 
The suggested forms contain such allegations as the 
following: 
<(Wilfully and maliciously gained the affections of E.F., · 
and induced him to have carnal intercourse with her, and 
sought to persuade him and entice him by offers of money and 
othe~ise to leave plaintiff without. support and go with de-
fendant." 
''Did falsely speak and pu~lish and declare concerning 
this plaintiff that she had been a lewd and unchaste woman, 
prior to her said marriage. That by reason of the speaking and 
publishing of said false and slanderous words by · defendant, 
13 
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the plaintiff's said husband's affections for her were and are 
alienated and destroyed." 
In the case of Buckley v. Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P (2) 
188, the complaint alleged ultimate acts to-wit: ctby means 
of gifts, arts, blandishments and inducements and by con-
tinuously associating himself with her, etc." 
The only allegation in plaintiff's complaint is nalienated 
the affections of Geraldine Beck Wilson from the plaintiff." 
That allegation is not an allegation of an ultimate fact. 
It is only a bald conclusjon. It alleges the result and not the 
facts from which the result follows. 
The following are allegations of ultimate facts: 
rr Caused numerous false statements to be made to plain-
tiff's wife as to her chastity which defendants claimed had been 
uttered and published by plaintiff.'' Monson v. Solace, (Mont.) 
212 P. 1103. 
rrBy subtle contrivances, by coaxing, and threats of dis-
inheriting the sadi Edward L. ·Williams, to entice him to sepa-
rate himself from plaintiff and leave and desert her " 
Williams v. Williams, (Colo.) 37 P. 614. 
rr ••• Persistently urged, coaxed and entreated her husband 
to leave and separate from his wife; that he advised with 
lawyers as to the best method by which a separation and divorce 
could be secured, wrote letters to plaintiff's husband urging and 
entreating him to separate from her immediately ... ,. White 
v. White, (Kan.) 90 P. 1087. 
14 
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\t ••• by coaxing and by threatening and by other methods, 
separated plaintiff's "rife from him and alienated her affec-
tions from the plaintiff, persuaded her_ to bring a divorce ac-
tion, persuaded plaintiff's wife to remain at their home and 
to refuse to go ~o plaintiff ... " Gvirtz v. Leiser, et ux, (Colo.) 
58 P. (2) 481. 
In the case of Nichols v. Nichols, (Mo.) 35 S.W. 577, 
the court said: ((Does the petition state tacts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action? The substantial charge in the 
petition is 
((that defendant wrongfully induced, influenced and 
enticed plaintiff's husband to abandon her, and to 
live separate and part from her, thereby depriving, 
and intending to deprive her of his affection, com-
fort, society and support. Defendants insist that this 
is but a statement of a conclusion of law; that the 
acts done and words spoken should have been stated. 
The Code requires the facts which constitute the 
cause of action to be stated. A statement of mere 
legal conclusions is not sufficient, and, on the . other 
hand, a detailed statement of the evidence is not 
required .... Pomeroy says: (The material facts 
which constitute· the grounds of relief . . . should be 
averred as they actually took place, and not the legal 
effect or aspect of those. facts, and not the mere 
evidence or probative matter by which their existence 
is established' . . . The ultimate fact which is con-
stitutive of the ~H.~-t of action in this case is that 
of wrongfully inducing the husband of plaintiff to 
abandon her . . . Wrongfully, inducing plaintiff's 
husband to abandon her is a conclusion of fact, de-
pending upon the proof of acts, declarations, and 
conduct of defendants. It is not a conclusion of law 
15 
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but a fact from which a legal conclusion is to be 
d '' rawn .· .. 
We submit that the complaint does not set out the ultimate 
facts; that it fails to state a claim against the defendant and 
that the same should be dismissed. Likewise our motion for a 
more definite statement should have been sustained and plain-
. tiff shquld have been required to a~lege the facts from which 
a legal· conclusion is to be drawn. t~Alienated affection of 
plaintiff' s· wife" instead of alleging a pure legal conclusion. 
POINT TWO 
THE VERDICT IS SO GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO 
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON 
SUCH GROUNDS. 
Sub-section ( 5) of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that a new trial shall be. granted in case of 
ttexcessive· or inadequate damages appearing to have· been 
given undner the .influence of passion or prejudice." A reading 
of the transcript will indicate that the entire trial was con-
ducted in an atmosphere of· passion and prejudice. Judge 
Hoyt was evident! y so shocked by the admitted conduct of 
the defendant that his prime purpose in the trial appears to 
have been to inflict punishment for breach of social customs. 
This attitude infected the jury and resulted, along with evi-
16 
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.. dence improperly admitted, in a grossly excessive total verdict 
of $7?,000.00. Dr. Oldroyd was tried by the jury only inci-
dentally for his conduct in regard to the plaintiff's wife. The 
excessive judgment was returned against him principally for 
the unforgiveable offense o{ being a more than average well-
to-do man in a small town. It would be surplusage to go 
into the question of small town prejudices in such matters. 
CounseL and most members of the court, have at various times 
in their lives resided in small towns and are fully aware of 
the prejudice formed by resident~. of small towns against the 
more affluent citizens. It is true, of course, that the court 
incidentally at the end of Instructio.n No. 9 (a) instructed 
the jury that the evidence admitted of the defendant's wealth 
should be considered only in regard to punitive damages and 
not in regard to compens~tory damages. The futility of such 
an instruction, however, is evident. It is difficult, if not im-
possible, for even a person with a trained legal mind to · 
exclude entirely a known fact from consideration of a problem 
in regard to which his emotions and prejudices tell him such 
a fact is material. 
Counsel has been able to discover few cases in the entire 
history of jurisprudenc~ in th~ United States where a verdict 
as la~ge or larger than this ~n alienation of affection suit 
has been returned by a jury. 
In the case of Oskamp v. Oskamp, 152 NE 208, decided 
by the Ohio Appellate Court in 1926, a judgment for $100,-
000.00 for alienation of the affections of a. husband was re-
duced by the Court to $75,000.00. 
17 
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In that case, how~ver, the circumstances were aggravated. 
There were several defendants whom it was alleged had con-
spired together to alienate the affections of the plaintiff's 
husband. The trial court directed the jury· that they could 
return punitive damages only if there were actual malice. 
Evidently the court felt that actual malice was proved because 
the · Appellate Court· having heard this instruction, upheld 
the verdict under the e~idence. As will be hereafter pointed 
out in this case, there is no evidence of actual malice but 
rather evidence which would negative even the possibility 
of a finding of implied malice. 
In the case of Mohn v. Tingley, 217 Pac. 73i3, a judgment 
of $100,000.00, $75,000.00 compensa.tory and $25,000.00 
.punitive damages, was rendered. The appelate court allowed 
the judgment to stand, however, the court found that the 
evidence showed a malicious and persistent course of conduct 
on the part of the defendant to engender ill will between the 
husband and wife and his child. Furthermore, the evidence 
showed that in addition to his conduct toward the plaintiff's 
wife, the defendant had induced the plaintiff to contribute 
almost $300,000.00 to a society of which the defendant was 
the head. 
In the case of Scharwath v. Brooks, 145 Atl. 727, a judg-
ment of $90,000.00 was returned in favor of a wife for the 
alienation of her husban4' s affections. This verdict was set 
aside by the appellate court as being excessive and a new trial 
was ordered. The case· was again tried and a jury returned a 
verdict of $70,000.00. It was again appealed and at 150 Atl. 
211 the court again set aside the verdict as excessive and 
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stated in its opinion that a verdict of $20,000.00 would have 
been ample and generous. 
In the case of Overton v. Overton, 246 Pac. 1095 (an 
Okla. case) the jury returned a verdict of $150,000.00 for 
alienation of the affections for the plaintiffs ·husband, $120,-
000.00 of such verdict being the compensatory damages and 
$30,000.00 for punitive damages. The evidence showed that' 
the plaintiff's husband and the defendant were married after 
the plaintiff had secured a divorce from her husband. The 
appellate court ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff filed a 
remittitur reducing the judgment to the sum of $40,000.00. 
An analysis of the cases reported will indicate that the 
vast majority of judgments for alienation of affections, even 
in cases showing a wanton and wilful course of conduct 
marked by seduction, are under $25,000.00 in amount and 
even in these cases the courts have frequently- set aside such 
judgments as excessive and returned the case for a new tria] 
or ordered a remittitur of a portion of the judgment. 
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Slaughter 
v. Van Winkle, 2 Pac. (2) 789, reduced a $6,000.00 judgment 
to $3,000.00 where a husband had sued his wife's aunt for 
alienation of his wife's affections. 
In the case of Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 Atl. 692, the 
plaintiff discovered the defendant and his wife in a condition 
which indicated that sexual intercourse had taken place be-
tween the two. The plaintiff went for a policeman and was at 
tacked by the defendant's chauffeur. The defendant thereupon 
had the plaintiff arrested for blackmail and the plaintiff was 
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actually imprisoned for two days awaiting trial. He was later 
acquitted of the blackmail charge and later brought an action 
for alienation of affection against the defenqant. The jury re-
turned ·a verdict of $20,000.00. Although in Connecticut the 
law as to punitive damages is that such are limited to the 
expenses of litigation there is no such limitation on compen-
satory damages. The trial court, nevertheless, set aside the 
verdict as being excessive and an appeal was taken. The appel-
late court held that the verdict should have been set aside 
only conditionally and that it should have been allowed to 
stand for the amount of $10,000.00 provided the plaintiff 
would accept·· this amount. The language of the appellate 
·court is revealing: 
((Comparison of the facts in these cases and the 
avv-ards therein with those in the present instance, with 
due consideration of recent developments, including the 
diminished purchasing power of money, discloses no 
logical or legitimate justification for verdicts for the 
amounts awarded in the present case. 
Extending our investigation to other jurisdictions, 
we find few cases in which verdicts of such amount 
have been sustained, and that notwithstanding preva-
lence. of the common-law doctrine permitting the award 
of punitive damages, in amount practically at the dis-
cretion of the jury, while in this state the purpose is 
not to punish the defendant for his offense, but to con1-
pensate the plaintiff for his injuries, and so-called 
punitive or exemplary damages cannot exceed the 
amount of the plaintiff's expenses of litigation, less 
taxable costs." 
In the case of Richards v. Lorleberg, 79 Fed. (2d) 413, 
the appellate court of the District of Columbia reduced a 
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verdict of $30,000.00 to $18,000.00. Certiorari was denied 
by the S~preme Court of the United States. 296 U.S. 242. 
In the case of Lindenberger v. Klapp, 254 Ill. App. 192, 
a verdict of $90,000.00 was originally returned. On order of 
the trial court the plaintiff had agreed to remit $45,000.00 
of the amount. On appeal the appellate court held that the 
original verdict had been so grossly excessive that it was 
evident that the· jury was governed by prejudic~ or passion and 
that even the reduced verdict should not have been allowed 
to stand. The entire verdict was then set aside. 
The Supreme Court of Main in Allen v. Rossi, 146 Atl. 
692 set aside as being excessive a judgment of $6,474.17 for 
alienation of a wife'·s affection coupled with criminal conver-
sation. 
In the case of Elmeier v. Elmeier, 231 N.W. 532, the 
Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska reduced a $9,000.00 
verdict to $6,000.00 for .alienation of a husband's affections. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington in the· 
case of Wood v. Miller, 265. P. 727, held a $2o,ooo.o'o verdict 
grossly excessive and remanded the case for a new trial. In 
the same court in the case of Essig v. Keating, 291 Pac. 323, 
a $12,500.00 verdict for alienation of a wife's affections was 
reduced to $5,000.00. The same court two years later, in the 
case of Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Pac. (2d) 617, reduced a 
$7500.00 verdict to $5000.00. 
In the case of Clark v. Orr, 173 So. 155, the· Supreme 
Court of the State of Florida reduced a $25,000.00 verdict in 
favor of a wife for alienation of her husband's affections to 
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$5,000.00. In the. same year in the case of Mallory v. Edgar, 
175 So. 863, a judgment of $35,900.00 was held excesstve 
and was set aside by the Florida court. 
A fairly recent case is the Idaho_ case of Summerfield v. 
Pringle, 144 Pac. (2) 214, where a $50,000.00 judgment, 
divided $35,000.00 compensatory and $15,000.00 punitive 
damages, was reduced by the court to $20,000.00 compensatory 
and $.1,000.00 punitive. The evidence in that case showed 
that the defendant was worth about $300,000.00, consider-
ably more than the evidence indicates that Dr. Oldroyd is 
worth. This case was decided by divided court, three to two. 
The minority opinion ·held that the verdict was so grossly 
excessive that it should have been set aside entirely rather 
than to be reduced. The majority opinion, however, points 
out several facts which the court held justified the verdict 
in the reduced amounts. First, it pointed out that as the wife 
of her former husband,· the plaintiff would have been en-
titled to share with him an inheritance of some $150,000.00. 
Furthermore, the evidence showed that at the time she mar-
ried her husband, the plaintiff had sold a home in California 
and had invested the proceeds from the sale of this home in 
a farming operation on a farm which she and her husband 
were renting from the defendant. The evidence further shows 
an extreme case of actual malice toward the plaintiff on the 
part of the defendant, a situation entirely lacking in the case 
now being considered. 
In the case of Ruske v. Ruske,_ 92 Fed. Supp. 348, decided 
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An excellent summary of the cases decided prior to 1930 
is found at 69 A.L.R. beginning on page 1279 and continuing 
to page 1295. An examination of the cases there annotated will 
show that few awards in cases of this kind have exceeded $10,-
000.00 and that almost without exception those in excess 
of this amount which have been sustained by the court have 
been accompanied by aggravated circumstances, usually by 
adultery. · 
So far as counsel is able to determine, this court has never 
passed direct! y upon the question of excessive damages in an 
alienation of affection suit. The two cases involving damages 
in an action of this type which have been before the court 
were reversed on other grounds. However, in the case of 
Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah, 77, 197 Pac. 605, the Court, · 
after having reversed the verdict because of improperly ex-
cluding evidence, placed in its ·opinion ·the following very 
interesting dicta regarding the $25,000.00 judgment: 
{(We have not commented upon the evidence for the 
reason that the case will probably be tried again. It is, 
therefore, neither necessary nor advisable to express 
an opinion as to whether this palpably exce~sive verdict 
should be held to be inoculated with the virus of passion 
and prejudice." 
There is no question of loss of support in this case as 
we have in the case where the affections of a husband are 
alienated; and yet the verdict in this case is a great deal 
larger than has ever been sustained in this court for an action 
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Counsel urges that a mere redetermination of the verdict 
in this case by this court would not serve the ends of justice. 
The verdict is so unreasonably large as to indicate conclusively 
that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice. Where 
a verdict is excessive, but not so grossly excessive as to indicate 
passion and. prejudice, the method usually followed by the 
courts is to reduce the _verdict. However, where it is so grossly 
excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice a reversal and 
a new trial is the proper remedy. 
This court has recognized this principle in the recent case 
of Wheat v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 250 Pac. (2d), 932, 
where the court, after having discussed an earlier optnton 
regarding reductions of excessive verdicts, stated: 
nNotwithstanding what was said therein, we regard 
the true rule to be that if the verdict is so excessive as 
to show that it must have been motiviated by prejudice 
or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as 
anger, resentment, indignation or some kindred emo-
tion has so overcome or . distorted the jury's reason 
that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, 
it should be unconditionally set aside." 
In this case the size of the verdict itself when considered 
against the background of the facts of the case is so clearly 
excessive as to indicate that the whole trial was colored with 
passion and prejudice. The size of the verdict, however, was 
not the only thing in the case that· indicated passion and prej-
udice. Other points going to establish this proposition will be 
hereafter discussed in this brief. 
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POINT THREE 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN AVER~ 
DICT OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
A. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN Ft:~lri~t-~ 4~ 
TIFF'S FAVOR AND IN FAILING .TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERDICT WAS ._ 
.~!:~T_~E~~~:~.~·:;t,:{f-~7.;=4  it is true that the jury is the excZive judge of 
the evidence and may believe what evidence it chooses. to 
believe regardless of where the preponderance of the evidence 
lies so far as the number of witnesses is concerned, the jury 
may. not disbelieve a portion of the plaintiff's own evidence 
while finding for him on other proposit~ons, nor may it, with~ 
out good reason, disregard entirely uncontradicted evidence 
on the pait o£ the defendant . 
. In this ~ase there is an absolute absence ·of any proof of 
financial loss to the plaintiff by reason of he claimed acts of 
the defendant. What· then does the award of $50,000.00 
compensatory damages represent; is it. pain and suffering, 
humiliation or loss of association with plaintiff's wife up to 
the time his wife obtained a divorce? Does . it represent both 
mel} tal and physical pain· and suffering as instructed by the 
I 
court in Instruction No.8? Does it include as Instruction No. 8 
implies, disruption of his family life when his divorce from 
his former wife had become final more than six months prior 
to the time such instruction was given? Is it conceivable that 
plaintiff is entitled to any substantial amount because of mental 
or physical pain and h~miliation, when we conside~ that the . 
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plaintiff, after the trial of the divorce case, and before the 
entry of the interlocutory degree, according to his own testi-
mony, Tr. 199, took another woman with him to Salt Lake 
City in order to turn over his daughter to his former wife 
(Tr. 199). And when it is remembered that plaintiff, accord-
ing to his own testimony, during the time he was the legal 
husband· of Geraldine Back Wilson, took another woman to 
4ances, shows, and on numerous occasions visited her in her 
apartment? (Tr.~ 199). ·• 
What pain and mental suffering, what humiliation, did 
plaintiff suffer justifying such an award? The injury to plain-
tiff in this case was an injury to his ego. His conduct through-
out his entire life leads to but one conclusion, that he felt his 
wife should be happy just to be his wife, and that he had 
no obligation to try and make her happy. The testimony in 
this case does not justify damages in any amount against the 
plaintiff. 
Certanily the plaintiff is not entitled to an allowance in 
damages which would be proper. where the affections of a 
woman who was madly in love with a kind, considerate, and 
loving husband were ·stolen by one who pursued her, and 
by gifts, blandishments and false accusation against her hus-
band, induced her to give herself to him and debauched her. 
As was said by the Massachusetts Court in the case of 
Palmer v. Crook: '1 ~tilt: 
(( . . . If the defendant invaded domestic peace, de-
stroyed conjugal felicity, and .by his solicitations alien-
ated and seduced the wife's affections from a kind and 
tender husband, he inflicted a much. more grievous 
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\Yrong and incurred a far heavier penalty in dan1ages, 
than he \VOuld have done if love and harmony and af-
fectionate intercourse had been previously impaired 
or lost, through the misconduct and cruel treatment of . 
the husband . . . '' 
It is made clear by the record in this case, that the verdict 
of the jury was not against -defendant because he alienated 
the affections of plaintiff's wife, but rather because defendant 
and plaintiff's wife were infatuated with each other. 
As stated in the case of Berger v. Levy (Cal.) 43 P (2) 
610, where the lower court was reversed and the case remanded 
for a new trial, the Court said: 
tt ( 1, 3) The gist of a cause of action of this kind is 
the enticing or taking away of the husband or the wife 
and the alienation of his or her affections . . . And it 
has been held that the word entice means to lureJ induceJ 
temptJ inciteJ or persuade a person to do a thing ... " 
({However, as declared in the leading case, (Ky.) 16 
LRA, (New Serial), 742 ... it is well settled that 
there is no ground for action where a spouse volun-
tarily gives his or her affection to another} the latter 
doing nothing wrongfully to win such affection. That 
is to say, in order to establish liability it must be shown 
that the defendant is the enticer, and mere proof of 
abandonment, or that the husband or wife may be 
maintaining an improper relation with another is not 
sufficient. In this regard the Court in that case goes on 
to say: ((In 15 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 895, the 
rule is thus stated: (In order to sustain an action for 
the alienation of the husband's affections it must ap-
pear in addition to the fact of alienation or the fact 
of the husband's infatuation for the defendant, that 
there had been a direct interference on the defendant's 
part, sufficient to satisfy the jury that the alienation 
was caused by the defendant, and the burden of proof 
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is on the plaintiff to show such interference.' Again, on 
page 866 it is said (but to maintain this action it must be 
established that the husband was induced to abandon 
the wife by some active interference on the part of 
the defendant.' In 3 Elliott on Evidence, Section 1643, 
it is said: (To entitle the plaintiff to recover in an action 
for alienating affections, the burden of proof is upon 
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must show that there 
was a direct interference upon the part of the defendant 
that not only was there infatuation of the husband or 
wife for the defendant, but that the defendant by 
wrongful act was the cause of it.' In the case of Wal-
dron v. Waldron (C.C.) 45 F. 315, the court, in an 
elaborate discussion of the question said: ( ·. . · . If the 
husband alienated his own affections from his wife, or 
if alienated by the plaintiff's own conduct, or both, 
without the interference of defendant, or if they were 
alienated by any other cause known or unknown, over 
which defendant had no control or exercised no in-
tentional direction or influence, then the plaintiff, 
howsoever unfortunate or wronged, cannot recover 
damages from the defendant.' " See also, 13 R.C.L. 
1464, and 30 C.J. 1123. 
There is no causal relation between plaintiff's ~oss of 
the affections of his wife and any act or acts of the defendant. 
Defendant probably breached the social standards es-
po~sed by. the trial judge and jury, but the breach of those 
standards was not the cause of the alienation of plaintiff's 
wife's affections. Plaintiff lost her affections not because of 
any act or word of the defendant. They were gone when de-
fendant acted. He made love, not to a wife devoted to plaintiff, 
but to one who had lost all respect she had for him. We shall 
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At the outset there is such conflict and confusion in plain-
tiff's statements that we cannot present a very logical or co-
herent picture, neither could plaintiff. · Plaintiff testified that 
he was happy with his wife until the latter part of November, 
1950. That Hwith one or two exceptions I had never gone 
to bed in my life with Geraldine that when we went to sleep 
she didn't turn over and say, t~oney, I love you,' and I would 
do the same to her-tWell, goodnight, Honey, I love you,' 
and we would turn over and. go to sleep, and that was from 
the beginning up until the latter part of November, 1950" 
(Tr. 98). 
Plaintiff called Mrs. Louise Harmer. She testified that 
she and her husband had been with· the Wilsons four or five 
times a week, either in Wilsons' home or the Harmers' home, 
for the last five years. That she did not observe any difference 
ill the attitude of the Wilsons toward each other during that 
period until after Mrs. Wilson went to California in the 
latter part of January, 1951 (Tr. 31 ). 
Plaintiff testfieid that up to the time has wife was operated 
on in January, 1951, that he and his wife were very happy. 
c] didn't know of anyone that enjoyed the companionship that 
we did, of going places and doing things, that we did · 
(Tr. 95-96). 
Plaintiff testified, however, that he knew in November of 
1950 that his wife was dressing up and going into town at 
five or six in the evening, so as to meet the doctor as he went 
into the post office or the drug store. He knew at that . time 
that his wife was attempting to intercept Dr. Oldroyd. 
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Plaintiff testified that he did not know what was carrying 
on until January 22, 1951, when he got the letter from the 
post office (Tr. 194) ~ 
Yet plaintiff testified that early in January, 1951, his wife 
told him she loved Dr. Oldroyd (Tr. 137-8). That he learned 
that his wife's affections for him were gone immediately after 
she came fron1 the hospital in January, 1951 (Tr. 137). 
Plaintiff testified that early in January, 1951, his wife told him 
she didn't love him or care for him (Tr. 137). 
Plaintiff testified that he and his wife discussed getting 
a divorce in 1942, '43, or '44 (Tr. 152). That before the di-
vorce action was filed he struck his wife and used vile and 
profane language toward her (Tr. 152). 
Plaintiff admitted that in November, 1950, he stated that 
his wife was cold and frigid and didn't want to have anything 
to do with him (Tr. 242-3). 
Plaintiff testified that he never owned a home (Tr. 140). 
He likewise testified that his annual income for the ten-year 
period prior to 1951 was from $3,000.00 to $7,000.00 a year 
(Tr. 141). 
Plaintiff testified that he began to be suspicious in Oc-
tober, 1950. That about October 15, 1950 his wife was out 
waving at the defendant, dressed up, with a ribbon around her 
hair (Tr. 155). 
On cross examination he testified as follows: 
Q. All right, go ahead, let's see anything else that 
showed she was in love with the doctor. 
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A. Possibly shortly after that Doctor would go past 
our home about eleven o'clock every day, or not 
every day, but most days, going down to his field 
to feed his stock, and on many occasion I was 
at home at the time working on my books, or 
dropped in at the home, and I would always see 
Geraldine out, with a big ribbon on her hair, and 
when Doctor would come past she would both 
wave at him and he would wave, and they would 
beam all over. 
Q. Will you fix the time of that, Mr. Wilson? 
A. This is November, late fall (Tr. 135). ,~·. 
Plaintiff testified that his suspicions were aroused in 1950 
by his wife's actions. 
Q. Now this was early in November? 
A. Well, it was in November. And her ~onstantly 
talking about Dr. Oldroyd. Her dressing up and 
going into town five or six o'clock in the evening so 
as to meet him or see him as he went into the post 
office or into the drug store. 
Q. Did you so testify? 
A.·Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew that your wife was attempting to inter-
cept Dr. Oldroyd as he went to the drug store and 
into the post office, Mr. Wilson? 
A. That was my observation. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was your belief? 
A. Yes, sir (Tr. 197). 
Plaintiff, struggling to show improper conduct which 
aroused his suspicion, testified to his wife's solicitude when 
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she saw the defendant slumped over the wheel of his auto· 
mobile in Novmeber, 1950 (Tr. 133-4). 
He further testified . that when his daughter had a sore 
throat his wife called Dr. Oldroyd, and he was suspicious be-
cause the defendant came down to the house with the pre-
scription (Tr. 13,5). 
It is undisputed that about September 10, 1950, while 
the doctor was operating, he stated that he would like to hurry 
and get through because he was going to Zion Canyon that 
afternoon to get "his daughter, and Geraldine Wilson stated 
to defendant, CtTake me with you," and he said, no. K. If 
you are serious." Plaintiff's wife said to defendant, ttls your 
wife going?" and defendant answered, ny es," and plaintiffs 
wife said, ((Well, count me out." (T~. 74). 
All this occurred before there is any evidence of any act 
of Dr. Oldroyd ·in regard to Mrs. Wilson. 
Plaintiff's wife testified that in 1947 she wasn't in love 
with her husband (Tr. 329). 
She testified that in May, 1950, her feelings for her hus-
band hadn't changed, that she .wasn't in love with him (Tr. 
329). 
Mrs. Wilson was asked if she had any modern conveni-
ences in either the big house or the small house, and she testi-
fied that she had running water and electricity. That she had 
an old washing machine given to her by her grandmother, 
but it leaked, and she had to put buckets under it every time 
she washed so that the water wouldn't run onto the floor (Tr. 
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3 31). She testified that she asked Dale to buy her a washing 
machine but he didn't (Tr. 331). 
That she had two or three different reasons for gotng 
to work. One reason was that was the only way she could get 
a few necessities. The next reason was, nAt the hospital I was 
respected a little bit. I had no respect at home. I was respected 
for the ability I had and not called down all the time" ( T r ~ 
332). Asked what necessities she referred t~ she answered, 
ttW ell, to buy some furniture for the house-we were using 
everyone's old cast-offs. I had to buy a vacuum ·cleaner, we 
were using Dale's mother's old vacuum that she had discarded 
two or three years before, but it didn't work. I· had to buy a 
washing machine. I had to buy myself an iron. I had to get my-:-
self a few clothes. I bought a chair or two. I bought a carpet. 
I helped to purchase the car .... "(Tr. 332). 
Mrs. Wilson was asked if they discussed divorce. 
A. We discussed it many times. We discussed it again 
in 1947. We discussed it again in 1950. We dis-
cussed it in 1951 (Tr. 336). 
Mrs. Wilson testified that Dr. Oldroyd had given her 
$20.00 at Christmas while she worked at the hospital. That 
he gave several of the nurses money. She testified that he gave 
her no property or gifts; that he had never asked her to go 
any place with him. She testified that she asked him to take 
her; that the doctor never asked her to leave the plaintiff ( T r. 
337). 
Mrs. Wilson testified that the defendant talked with 
them about staying together. 
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Q. Tell us what was said by the Doctor on that occa-
sion, Mrs. Wilson. 
A. Doctor told us to quit acting like a couple of school 
kids. That we had two children to raise, why 
couldn't we get along and keep our family to-
gether (Tr. 341). 
She testified that her _husband used physical force an4 
violence on her (Tr. 342). That" he came home drunk and 
threw a bar of soap at her and hit her (Tr. 344). That shortly 
after that he came in from his bedrooni and awakened her 
at 2: 3·0 in the morning and said, t (What you need is a damn 
good licking,'' and he turned her over and started spanking 
her. The next time was the day she left, he started to pick a 
quarrel again. She called him a name and he struck her in 
the face and knocked her across the room ( T r. 344) . 
Mrs. Wilson testified that her husband accused her of 
infidelity (Tr. 346). She testified that she didn't love her 
husband in October, 1950 (Tr. 349). She testified that in 
October, 1950 she had no affection for her husband, and that 
since October 14, · 1950 she still didn't love him. ((Didn't 
love him then and don't love him now." She testified that since 
October 14, 1950 she had no affection for him (Tr. 350). 
Mrs. Wilson was asked the following question, and ans-
wered as follows: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did the defendant, Dr. Oldroyd, 
do anything to cause the alienation of your affec-
tions towards your husband, Dale Wilson? 
A. No, he didn't. Dale had already alienated his own 
affections (Tr. 351). The Court struck out the latter 
part of the answer. 
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Plaintiff's attitude toward his wife is disclosed by his testi-
mony that he took women to dinner, shows, and dances during 
the time he was married to Geraldine Beck Wilson and before 
there is any accusation that she had any association with Dr. 
Oldroyd (Tr. 144). 
It is undisputed that on January 24, 1951, the plaintiff 
wrote his wife at Riverside, California, requesting her to re-. 
turn to Payson and told her if she would he would treat her 
as a husband should treat his wife, . he would treat her better 
(Tr. 186). 
Plaintiff testified that he and his wife had quarreled about 
a man other than the defendant, in the summer of 1950 (Tr. 
186). The evidence discloses that since January 24, 1951, the 
only interest or affection plaintiff had for his wife was the 
dollars he thought he could get (Tr. _189). 
We submit that the record justifies the conclusion that 
plaintiff's wife would have obtained a divorce from plaintiff 
had she never known Dr. Oldroyd, because of plaintiff's 
treatment of her. This law suit would not have been filed if 
plaintiff had not, by trick and deceit, obtained the letter written 
by Dr. Oldroyd and never.received by Mrs. Wilson. 
The letter didn't add any suspicion or give plaintiff any 
additional knowledge. He had been advised that this wife 
had no affection for him some time before that date. It 
merely gave a club to plaintiff with which to work on the 
defendant. He knew he had lost his wife. He knew she didn't 
love him-had no affection for him. He knew that he had 
never done anything to retain or regain her love. The crocodile 
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tears shed by plaintiff, as disclosed in the record (Tr. 107), 
were not because of his loss of his wife's affections. Upon 
receipt of that letter plaintiff waged a campaign to take the 
doctor. 
His testimony, shown at page 118 of the transcript, justi-
fies such ·a conclusion. 
He said: 
CCDoctor, I am sorry that I got this letter. I hate to 
· have a tuhip of this kind, and hate to be forced to 
use a whip to have you leave my wife alone, and let 
my wife come back to me ... but I have got it, and 
now we both know that the truth is out . . . and let's 
forget the. thing, and not carry it any further . . . 
W el, Doc, I might hav~ to sue you for all you have 
got if you don't leave my family alone. We talked back 
and forth in a s.ort of kidding way." (Tr. 118). 
Plaintiff asked defendant to write to plaintiff's wife and 
ask her to come back and said that if he did everything would 
be fine. A letter was written by defendant to plaintiff's wife 
urging her to come back (Tr. 121). 
Plaintiff testified that the conversation above set out 
was had on the 21st or 22nd of January (Tr. 117). But the 
evidence is undisputed that the letter was not mailed until 
January 21 (Tr. 112). 
It is significant that within a day or two after defendant 
wrote the letter to plaintiff's wife that plaintiff had a conver-
sation with Lee Nebeker, his cousin, and a lawyer. Planitiff 
testified that he said, CtLee, I am not interested in this as a law 
suit. I am concerned with my children, and Geraldine is going 
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to go her way and I am going mine ... $10,000.00 or $15,000.00 
\vouldn' t hurt the Doc very much and it would set those kids 
up and insure an education for them, and that would be as 
far as I would be interested in going'' ( T r. 190) . 
The letter received by plaintiff did not give plaintiff the 
information that his wife was in love with the defendant;. it 
did not inform him that his wife had no affection for plantiiff; 
plaintiff's wife had advised plaintiff of that long before. 
What compensatory da~ages is plaintiff entitled to when 
we consider that no act or word of the defendant caused plain-
tiff's wife to los.e or transfer her affections? The mental pain 
and suffering which plaintiff sustained can best be measured 
when we consider his testimony that he visited another woman, 
took her to dinner, to shows, to dances, and visited with her 
in 4er apartment, on many occasions during the time he was 
the husband of Geraldine Beck Wilson (Tr. 199). 
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife, in 1943, told her 
father that she had lost all her love and respect for the plain-
tiff, and didn't want to live with him any longer (Tr. ·264). 
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife told her father, in 
1947, that she wanted to get a divorce,· that she didn't love 
the plaintiff any more, and had lost all respect f~r him ( T r. 
265). 
It is undisputed that plaintiff's wife told her father in 
May, 1950, that sh~ had left Dale, that she was through, that 
she wasn' ~ going to go back to Dale any. more, that it was 
just a waste of time, doing them both an .injury, living under 
the circumstances as they were doing (Tr. 265-6). 
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Plaintiff's wife testified that in a phone conversation with 
defendant's wife, in ]an1:1ary, 1951, that she said, (tAll we 
have done for years is fight and quarrel, and we are going to 
get a divorce (Tr. 353). 
Counsel for plaintiff asked Mrs. Wilson the following 
questions and she gave the following answer: 
Q. What did you mean when you said you lost your 
affection for Dale? 
A. I didn't love him. I didn't like him. I had no re-
spect for him. I didn't like him as a person, as a 
husband, I didn't like what he stood for-in other 
words, I didn't like him (Tr. 366). 
Plaintiff admitted that he asked defendant's wife, about 
June 10, 1951, if she had any letters that Geraldine had written 
to the doctor and that he said to defendant's wife, ((Well if 
you had one I would trade the one Doc wrote to Geraldine 
for it" (Tr. 205). 
Plaintiff further admitted that he may have said to de-
fendant's wife, (tif I had a letter written to Doctor by Ger-
aldine I could beat Geraldine down in the amount of money 
and support money she is asking from me". (Tr. 205-6). 
Plaintiff further admitted that he may have said to de-
fendant's wife on June 10, 1951, (tWill you do something for 
me? You tell Doc that he had better write and tell Geraldine 
to cut down on her demands of me. And if he ever gets her 
to cut down on her demands I will not hurt him, but if he 
doesn't I will crack this thing wide open with this letter, (Tr. 
206-7 and 209). 
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Plaintiff admitted that he and his wife attended the 
Firemen's New Years Eve Party either in 1948 or '49 and 
that Mrs. Wilson said to plaintiff that she was tired and 
would like to g~ home and that Sherman Loveless took 
his wife home from the party and he remained after she 
left (Tr. 207-8). Plaintiff testified that between the time of 
his marriage and October 15, 1950, he had taken women other 
than. immediate members of his family to dinners, shows and 
dances (Tr. 144). 
Plaintiff testified that in February, 1951, he stated to de-
fendant's wife over the telephone, nwe just can't get along. 
She is my wife legally, but that's all (Tr. 202). 
Plaintiff's wife testified that before she left for California 
in January, 1951, she talked to her father, Dr. Beck, ovef 
the telephone about coming home. That plaintiff's wife was 
crying and plaintiff took the phone from her and said to her 
father, Dr. Beck, nit's all· my fault, Doc; if I could only keep 
my blg mouth shut" (Tr. 355). 
From the foregoing facts, one conclusion is inescapable: 
the Wilsons were hopelessly estranged long before Dr. Old-
royd ever became involved. Neither cared for the other and 
Mrs. Wilson was more than willing to carry on a flirtation with 
any man that was attractive to her, whether Dr. Steele or Dr. 
Oldroyd. Furthermore, it is obvious that the only value that 
Wilson placed on his wife's affection was the dollar and cent 
value which he might recover in a lawsuit. Under such circum-
stances, the case should not even have been submitted to the 
jury~ The judge, however, having submitted it to the jury, 
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should have set the verdict aside as against the evidence on 
the motion for new. trial, ~,...(. #-71. ~.'""' ~ 1? , 
~~ .. ~., '-'. ~~~ 
• . ~-;J161C..:.4.4.i.'-'4·~ 
POINT FOUR 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF MALICE, WILFUL-
NESS OR WANTONNESS ON THE PART OF THE DE;. 
PENDANT TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION OF THE 
QUESTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY. 
The question of what is required to justify a verdict for 
punitive damages in an alienation of affections suit is, so far 
as counsel can ·determine, a question of first impression before· 
this court; however, the court has considered the tnatter of 
punitive dab;lages in actions of other types. The rule as to 
punitive damag~s in this ~tate is concisely stated by the court 
in the ca.se of Haycraft v. Adams, 24 Pac. (2d) 1110. At 
page 1115 · the Court states:· 
CCExemplary,' punitive, or vindictive damages are such 
damages as are in excess of the actual loss,· and are 
allowed where a tort is . aggravated by evil motive, 
actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud:' 
Murphy v. ·Booth, 36 Utah, 285, 103· P. 768, 770. 
An examination of the record in this case would convince 
even the most biased observer that none of th~ elements set 
forth in the above quotation are present. If punitive damages 
. are assessable in this case, it would follow as a matter of course 
that in any alienation of affections suit punitive damages are 
assessable wherever compensation damages are assessable. 
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This certainly cannot be the law. Although counsel does not 
intend to attempt to justify the conduct of Dr. Oldroyd and 
Mrs. Wilson, it is certain that anything less than is actually 
shown by the evidence here would not g1ve rise to a cause 
of action at all. 
The most usual case where punitive damag~s. are awarded· 
are in cases where seduction or adultery are concerned. As 
was pointeed out in the Statement of Facts, there is no evidence, 
or even an intimation, of such conduct in this case. There is 
certainly no actual malice shown nor ·any intent on the part of 
Dr. Oldroyd to break up the Wilsons' home. Dr. Oldroyd 
was and still is a married man, residing with his wife and 
family. When it appeared that the Wilsons _were going to 
separate, whether as a result of the acts of Dr. Oldroyd,· as 
the plaintiff contends, or because of the conduct of the plaintiff 
himself, as Mrs. ~ilson contends, Dr. Oldroyd actively inter-
ceded in. the matter and attempted to repair the breach and 
to persuade. Mrs. Wilson to return to her husband. Where 
in such conduct can be found ((evil motive, actual malice, delib-
erate violence, oppression or fraud?" 
The following lat:Iguage is found ·1n Vol. 2 7 of Amer. 
Juris., Sec. 546: 
( ]t has been held incumbent on the plaintiff to show 
circumstances of aggravation or malice in addition to 
the malice implied by law, in order to justify the award-
ing of punitive damages, and it has been said that to 
warrant. an allowance of such damages, the act com-
plained of must not only be ·unlawful, but also par-
take of a wanton and malicious ·nature." 
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In the case of Eshelman v. Rawalt, 16 A.L.R. 1311, 131 
NE 675, the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois stated: 
t (While the doctrine allowing such damages has 
been criticized, and in some states has been repudiated, 
it was said in Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Del. 294, that the 
doctrine is too firmly rooted in our jurisprudence to 
be disturbed. It was said, however, that the rule allo\v-
ing such damages has been severely questioned by many 
able jurists, one of whom is Professor Greenleaf, and 
the courts, recognizing the doctrine within its proper 
scope, ought to exercise a high degree of watchfulness 
to prevent it from being perverted and extended beyond 
the real principles upon whic;h it is based, by allowing 
plaintiff, through the instrumentality of instructions 
to the jury, to characterize the acts of the defendant 
with degrees of enormity and turpitude which the 
law does not affix to them. The universally recognized 
rule where the doctrine is in force is that such damages 
may be recovered only in cases where the wrongful 
act complained of is characterized by wantoness, mal-
ice, oppression,- or circumstances of aggravation." 
Chicago v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, 95 Am. Dec. 590; Pear-
son v.. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 32 Am. St. Rep. 113, 29 N.E. 
854. 
Even though most of the jurisdictions in the country still 
permit the recovery of punitive or exemplary damages in 
various types of tort action, the courts generally agree that the 
allowance of such damages is foreign to our theory of the 
purpose of a legal act.ion which is fundamentally to make 
the injured party whole and not to reward him for the fact 
that he happens to have been injured. In some jurisdictions 
punitive damages are barred by statute, while almost every-
where the tendency seems to be to restrict the application of 
this principle wherever possible. As pointed out above the 
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law in Utah appears to be well established that where malice 
is made a basis for the recovery of such damages it must be 
actual malice shown by evidence independent of the mere 
fact that the act complained of was committed. In some juris-
dictions in case of alienation of affections action, the malice 
need not be actual malice but may be implied from the facts 
of the particular case. In these jurisdictions the court gen-
erally gives lip service to the theory that malice may be implied 
from the intentional doing of a wrongful act. However, the 
courts then generally go on to say that" the act must be wilful 
or wanton. The term wilful, as it appears to be applied in 
these cases, does not merely mean volitionally but means 
something more-not merely an intentional doing of an act 
which might in the minds of reasonable men result in an injury 
to another individual ,but the actual intent to inflict the injury 
which actually does result. 
The state of Colorado appears to be one of the most 
liberal states in the union so far as the allowance of punitive 
damages in alienation of affections actions. There are several 
Colorado cases touching upon this point. A mere reading of 
the language of some of these cases might lead one to the 
conclusion that no greater intent is necessary to sustain a 
judgment for punitive damages than is necessary to sustain 
a cause of action for compensatory damages. An actual exami-
nation of the facts of the cases, however, reveal that in each 
case where punitive damages are allowed there is much more 
than a mere doing of an act which might cause the transfer 
of affection from the wife to another person. In each · case 
there is an affirmative intent to accomplish such transfer of 
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affections. As has been pointed out previously, tn the case 
now before the court, the relationship between Dr. Oldroyd 
and Mrs. Wilson appears to have been an emotional attach-
. ment. which grew up largely as a ·result of their proximity 
in their work. There is no intent, motive or design on the 
. part of Dr. 0 ldroyd to cause a lessening~ of Mrs. Wilson's 
affections for her husband or to cause her to leave bini. The 
worst that can be said about Dr. Oldroyd's actions, so far as 
they affect Mrs. Wilson, is ·that the. doctor failed to give 
proper consideration to the po~sible con.sequences of a display 
of affection for Mrs. Wilson. 
A number of states in the union have by statute taken 
away any cause of action for . alienation of affections. Still 
another group have taken away the right to punitive damages 
in such cases, while in the great majority where punitive 
damages are permitted_,_ a wanton state of mind, usually ac-
companied by seduction is required in order to justify the 
return of a verdict for punitive damages. Although as stated 
above, the Supreme Court of this state .has never passed upon 
this question in an alienation of affections suit, the general rule 
appears to be well established that there must be present evil 
motive, actual malice, deliberate violence, oppression or fraud, 
which elements are all conspicuously lacking_ in the case now 
before the court. 
POINT FIVE· 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PLAIN-
TIFF TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE FINANCIAL 
WEALTH OF THE DEFENDANT. 
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, So far as counsel is able to 'determine this Court has 
not decided the question of \Vhether or not evidence of the 
financial \Vealth of the defendant is competent as going to the 
amount of punitive damages. There appears to be a split of 
authority in the various jurisdictions in this country upon this 
question. Some jurisdictions hold that the wealth of the de-
fendant is in no case competent as going to the question of 
damages. See Texas Public Utliities Corp. v. Edwards, 99 
S.W. 420. In other jurisdictions, however, such evidence is 
received on the theory th~t the jury or the court must know the 
financial situation of the defendant in order to properly assess 
punitive damages for the reason that damages which might 
be trivial to a rich man would be ruino'us to a poor man. How-
ever, it is uniformly held that the wealth of the defendant is 
not material to the question of actual damages and that before 
evidence of· the defendant's ·wealth may be admitted, there. 
must be evidence in the record which would justify the im-
position of punitive damages. 
In·the case of Jones v. Carter, 7 So. (2d) 519, the Supreme. 
Court of Mississippi reversed a case on ~he grounds that evi-
dence of the defendant's wealth was admitted when there was 
not a sufficient showing to justify the imposition of punitive 
damages. They held that such matters should be considered 
in connection with the assigned error that the verdict was 
grossly excessive. The language of the Court is as follows: 
nit should 'also be noted that over the objection of 
the defendant, he was asked as to how much money he 
had, where it was being kept, and about a transfer to 
his daughter of a portion of a deposit of money in a 
bank, and was also questioned about the conveyance 
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of some real estate to his son, all before any testimony 
had been introduced as to the facts and circumstances 
in connection. with the accident. 
Proof of the financial worth of the defendant in such 
cases is wholly inadmissible except where punitive 
damages are recoverable. There is no basis for even 
a suspicion that the defendant would be liable for 
punitive damages in the case at bar, nor was this suit 
for discovery or to set aside alleged fraudulent convey-
ances. Obviously such· testimony was highly prejudi-
cial to the defendant, and while not directly assigned 
as error on this appeal, the Court may under Rule 6 
of the Rules of the Court tat its option notice a plain 
error not assigned or distinctly specified.' We exercise 
the option to notice the error here in connection with 
the argument that the verdict is excessive and contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.'' 
It is elementary that where certain evidence is material 
only under a certain theory of a case, such evidence may be 
admitted only where the basic evidence to sustain such theory 
is before the court. As has been pointed out above, an instruc-
tion to the jury that they may consider the defendant's wealth 
when fixing punitive damages but may not consider it when 
fixing compensatory damages is futile. It is obvious that if 
such information is before the jury, it will color their entire 
deliberations, and no better evidence of that fact can be found 
than the judgment in this particular case. If a plaintiff were 
permitted to give evidence of the financail wealth of a defend-
ant merely because. the plaintiff had pleaded a case for exemp-
lary damages, then in all tort cases where a defendant was 
a man of greater wealth than the plaintiff, the plaintiff would 
plead that he was entitled to punitive damages regardless of 
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the evidence so that he could get before the jury evidence of 
the defendant's wealth in the hope that it would color their 
deliberations as to compensatory damages. Counsel submits 
that if it be held that there was not sufficient evidence to justify 
the return of a verdict for punitive damages, the court erred, 
not only in submitting that question to .the jury, but also in al-
lowing evidence of the defendant's wealth to be introduced 
in evidence. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED ON INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS: 
(a) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTIONS 
NUMBERED 4, 5, 6, and 7 THAT THEY SHOULD 
FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THEY FOUND 
THAT THE DEFENDANT PERSUADED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S WIFE TO DESERT OR LEAVE THE 
PLAINT~FF. 
The instructions to the jury given by the court in this 
case read more like an indictment of the defendant than like 
an impartial discourse on the law applicable to the case. In-
structions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 restate and reiterate for the purpose 
of emphasis to the jury, the circumstances under. which they 
may return a verdict for the plaintiff. In each of these instruc-
tions, the court states a number of situations in the alternative, 
any one of which will justify the return of a verdict for the · 
plaintiff. In each of the instructions the court instructs the 
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jury that it may return a . verdict for the plaintiff if they find 
that the defendant intentionally encouraged the plaintiff's 
wife to desert or cease her association with the plaintiff as his 
wife. It is submitted that there is no evidence in the case indi-
cating such actions or such intent on the part of the defendant. 
In fact, the undisputed evidence is to the effect that Dr. Old-
royd encouraged the plaintiff's wife to remain with him. 
It is well established law that it is erroneous to give an 
abstract instruction not based upon evidence in the case even 
though the state~ent of law contained in such instruction is 
correct as such an abstract principle. With the question of 
· whether or not such an instruction might be correct in some 
cases of alienation of affections, we need not concern ourselves 
here, for it is obviously not a proper instruction to be given 
in this case, and the· giving of it might well mislead the jury. 
In the case of Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 Pac. 653, 
the court reversed. anq remanded for a new trial a verdict in 
the lower court for the reason that the court had given an 
abstract instruction of law to the jury which was not based 
upon any evidence in the case. 
In the case of Jensen v. Utah Railway Co., 72 Ut. 3·66, 270 
Pac. 349, the court in reversing and remanding for a new 
trial a verdict in the lower court stated: 
((Paragraph 13 likewise is erroneous. Whether as 
an abstract proposition such a charge is correct, the 
authorities are in conflict. We need not now and do 
not determine whether as an abstract proposition such 
a charge is or is not correct or the circumstances when 
a charge concerning such a subject may properly be 
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given. It is enough to say as we do that there is not 
anything in the record to render such a charge applic-
able * * * ~ Thus the charge falls within the familiar 
rule that it is error to give instructions based on a 
state of facts which there is no evidence tending to 
prove ·or which the undisputed evidence in the case 
shows did not exist even though such instructions con-
tain correct statements of law." 
For the court to repeat in three different instructions in 
only slightly varying language a charge that the jury might 
find for the plaintiff, if in fact they found that the defendant 
encouraged the plaintiff's wife to leave or desert him, when 
the uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that there was no 
such action on the part of the defendant, but . that rather the 
defendant actively interceded to attempt to get the parties 
back together, was clear~y reversible error. 
(b) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 6 THAT THE LAW PRESUMES TI-fE 
POSSIBILITY OF A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN 
· MAN AND WIFE. 
Of all the instructions given to the jury, in the opinion of 
counsel, instruction No. 6 was the most clearly erroneous and 
the most badly damaging to the defendant. As was stated 
previously in the brief, as to much of the evidence in the 
case, there was no dispute, however, there was a ser.ious dts-
put as to the state of the marriage relationship between Dale 
Wilson and Geraldine Wilson prior to the time that Geraldine 
Wilson became well acquainted with Dr. Oldroyd. If Dale 
Wilson's testimony is to be believed, there was no strained 
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relationship between himself and wife prior to that time, and 
only on such a basis could the jury have found any substantial 
damages in the case. On the other hand, Geraldine Wilson's 
testimony was that prior to the time she knew Dr. Oldroyd 
more than casually, the marriage relationship between herself 
and Dale Wilson was already wrecked beyond the possibility 
of salvage. If the jury believed this testimony, then, of course, 
they could have returned no verdict in favor of Dale Wilson. 
These two conflicting sets of testimony were before the 
jury and each of the parties had the right to have the jury con-
sider this evidence without any comment· by the court on the 
weight of such evidence, or without any supposed rule of 
law to give greater weight to the evidence on one side than 
to the other. The court instructed the jury as follows: 
t cy ou are instructed. that so long as the marriage 
status continues between husband and wife, the la\v 
presumes that there is a possibility of a reconciliation 
between the parties even though they have become 
strained or had marital difficulties." 
This instruction is equivale~t to saying to the jury: "Even 
though the evidence may convince you beyond question that 
the marriage between the Wilsons was so strained that it ap-
pears that it could not have been repaired, still you way not 
find on that basis, for in the eyes of the law so long as the 
marriage relationship existed, it may have been repaired and 
you may return damages on the basis that it would have been 
repaired.'' 
This court has already reversed and remanded for a new 
trial an alienation of affections judgment on an instruction 
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almost identical to this one. Because the language of the court 
in that case so forcefully argues the position of the defendant 
in this case, counsel takes the liberty of quoting extensively 
from the language of the court in the case of Buckley v. Francis, 
6 Pac. (2d) 188: 
~~Defendant assigns as error the giving of the follow-
ing instruction to the jury: ny ou are instructed that 
it "\Vas not necessary for the plaintiff to offer direct 
proof of his wife's affections for him prior to the 
alleged wrongful acts complained of. The law pre-
sumes that a wife who lives with and cohabits vvith· 
her husband, she bearing children the issue of such 
cohabitation has an affection for him." 
In two cases recently decided by this court, the legal · 
effect of a presumption is discussed and decided. State 
v.' Green, 6 P. (2d) 177; In re Newell's Estate, .5 P. 
(2d) 230. It is held in each of those cases and other 
cases there cited that a presumption is a rule of law 
which may be relied upon as establishing a prima facie 
case for the party in whose favor the presumption exists 
until, and only until, the opposing party goes forward 
with some evidence which tends to overcome the pre-
sumption, that a presumption' cannot stand in the face 
of facts, and that, when evidence of facts appears in 
cause, the presumption, having served its purpose, 
passes utterty out of ·consideration of the trier of the 
facts. In those cases we condemned instructions which 
directed the jury to undertake the impossible task of 
considering and weighing presumptions as if they were 
evidence. While the court in the instruction complain-
ed of did not expressly direct the jury to consider as 
evidence the presumption that a ·wife who lives and 
cohabits with her husband has affection for him, the 
jury might well have so understood the instruction. 
The fact that the wife of the plaintiff was living and 
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cohabiting with him at the time of the alleged wrongful 
acts of the defendant may be said to tend to support 
a finding that she, at that time, had an affection for 
him; but it by no means follows, in the light of the 
· evidence in the record to the contrary, that she in 
fact had such affection. If it may properly be said, as 
some courts have said, that there is a presumption 
that a wife has affection for a husband with whom 
she lives and cohabits, such presumption is founded 
upon the facts of living and cohabiting with the hus-
band, and the presumption has no evidentiary force 
independent of the facts upon which it is founded. 
In this case the jury had before it the evidence that 
the plaintiff and his wife were living and cohabiting 
together as husband and wife at the time of the alleged 
. wrongful acts of the defendant. Such evidence \vas 
proper for the jury to consider as bearing upon the 
question of whether the wife did or did· not have af-
fection for the husband, but such evidence may not 
be aided, strengthened, or rendered irrebutable by 
a presumption that she had affection for him. A pre-
sumption may not be considered or weighed as evi-
dence in a cause, so likewise, it may not serve the 
purpose of either adding weight to or rendering con-
clusive evidence which has been received in a cause. 
The instruction complained of was calculated to mis-
lead the jury into determining the issues of fact, not 
upon the evidence alone, but upon the evidence aided 
by a presumption favorable to plaintiff's cause. The 
plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of a presumption 
in aid of his evidence upon the· issue of whether or 
not his wife had affection for him at .the time o( the 
alleged wrongful acts · of the defel).dant. 
The court erred in giving the instruction complained 
of. It follows that the judgment should be, and it 
according! y . is, reversed. This cause is remanded to 
the district court of Box Elder County, with directions 
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to grant a new trial. Appellant is awarded his costs 
on appeal." 
The giving of instruction No. 6 by the court practically 
amounts to a n1andate to the jury to return a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff. The giving of this instruction alone, even if 
not accompanied by the many other errors, would justify the . 
remanding of the case for a new trial. 
(c) IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 9 (a) REGARDING PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES. 
Instruction No. 9 (a) is erroneous in t\VO regards. The 
Court erred in instructing the jury at all regarding punitive 
damages because of the fact that the evidence in the case di,d 
not warrant the imposition of punitive damages. As has been 
pointed out in the immediately preceding section; it is error 
to instruct upon evidence not in the record even though the 
instruction of law as an abstract proposition may be correct. 
Furthermore, in this case Instruction 9 (a) is not a correct 
statement of the law even as an abstract proposition. The 
Court instructed the jury <(they (exemplary damages) are al-
lowable under the law as a punishment for wilful and wanton 
wrong doing and to set an example to deter others from similar 
wilful and wanton acts." Nowhere in its instruction does 
the Court instruct the jury as to what is meant by the term 
wilful. The understanding of the orinary person as to the term 
wilful is an act done intentionally. A jury so instructed, there-
fore, could find exemplary damages against a person in any 
case of negligence. Almost without exception the negligent 
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act done is done wilfully, but without an intent to injure; the 
negligence being in the failure of the individual to pro peri y 
realize that the injury actually inflicted will flow from the 
act intentionally done. It is clear that the term wilful, as ap-
plied to punitive damages, means more than the intentional 
doing of an act which results in damage to another. It means 
the intentional doing of an act with intent to inflict the harm 
actually inflicted. 
The following language is found at 25 Corpus Juris. Sec. 
728: 
tcMere negligence in the absence of wantonness, 
circumstances of malice, or .other essential aggravating 
circumstances will not justify a recovery of exemplary 
damages. Such damages may be awarded only where 
the negligence complained of is gross." 
To instruct the jury that they may return a verdict for 
exemplary damages if they find that the defendant's act was 
wilful without in any way defining what is meant by a· wilful 
act is clearlr misleading and as such did not convey to the jury 
a correct understanding of the principles authorizing the im-
position of punitive damages. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND EX-
CLUDING EVIDENCE IN THE FOLLOWING PARTI-
CULARS: 
(a) IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF GERALDINE 
WILSON REGARDING EVENTS AND OCCUR-
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RENCES DURING HER MARRIED LIFE WITH 
THE PLAINTIFF, DALE WILSON. 
Mrs. Wilson was asked: 
Q. Now at that time, Mrs. Wilson, were you and Dale 
getting along all right? 
l\1r. Sherman Christensen: Object to that, if the court 
please, as incompetent, irrelevant and im1naterial, 
the witness is disqualified to answer, a confidential 
communication or matter between them. 
THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that the ob-
jection is well taken_ (Tr. 300). 
The witness was asked the following question: 
Q. I call your attention to 1943. Do you recall if you 
left then? 
The question was objected to as leading and the objection 
was sustained (Tr. 301). 
Mrs. Wilson was asked: 
Q. Was there any other reason you left? 
The. question was objected to as being incompetent, Ir-
relevant, immaterial and privileged. 
THE COURT: She may answer yes or no. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was that? 
Mr. Sherman Christensen: Same objection, if the court 
please. 
THE COURT: Would you state your objection? 
Mr. Sherman Christenson: Incompetent, irrelevant and 
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immaterial and privileged under the statute as to 
the disqualification of confidenital communications. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained (Tr. 302). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Now, while you were in Payson, living in Payson, 
Mrs. Wilson, what were· the living conditions \'."ith 
respect to the home and the things that you were 
required to do in your housework? 
·The court sustained the objection that the question was 
too general and that no time was fixed (Tr. 330). 
Reference was then made to the time plaintiff and his 
wife moved into the big house and the witness was asked: 
Q. What were the conditions with respect to the house 
and your duties at that time? 
The question was objected to as calling for a conclusion 
• 
and being duplicituous and the objection was sustained (Tr. 
330). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Can you state with respect to what you were obliged 
to do? 
Objection was made that it called for a conclusion, and 
the objection was sustained (Tr. 330). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. I call your attention to about the year '43 or '4·1 
and ask you if you and your husband discussed 
divorce at that time? 
Objection was made that the question was incompetent, 
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irrelevant and immaterial, the witness not competent to testify, 
and the court sustained the objection (Tr. 336). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did Dr. Oldroyd ever ask you 
to leave the plaintiff? 
A. No, he never asked me to leave the plaintiff. He 
always encouraged me to stay with him, stay with 
my home and take care of my two children. 
On motion the court struck out the latter part of answer 
(Tr. 337-8). 
The witness was asked: 
A. Did he ever encourage you to stay with your hus-
band and family? 
Objection was made that the question was incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial and hearsay and the court sustained 
the objection (Tr. 33,8). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Did he ever say anything to you with respect to 
staying with his-or your husband? 
The court directed the witness to say yes or no {Tr. 339). 
A. Doctor told us to quit acting like a couple of school 
kids. We had two children to raise, why couldn't 
we get along and keep our family together. He had 
always encouraged me to stay with Dale (Tr. '341). 
On motion the court struck out the latter part of answer 
(Tr. 342). 
The witness was asked: 
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Q. Now, on that date did you have any affection what-
ever for your husband? 
The question was objected to on the grounds that it was 
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and privileged and 
called for a conclusion. The court sustained the objection on 
the ground that it was leading (Tr. 349-50). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Did you have any feelings toward him on that day? 
The following objection was made: nSame objection, if 
the court please. The objection was sustained (Tr. 350). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, did the defendant, Dr. Old-
royd, do anything to cause the alienation of your 
affection toward your husband, Dale Wilson? 
A. No, he didn't. Dale had already alienated his own 
affections. 
On motion the court struck out . the latter part of the 
answer (Tr. 351). 
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, what caused you to lose your 
affection for your husband? 
The court sustained the objection on the ground that it 
was privileged and a violation of the rule under the statute 
(Tr. 352). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Mrs. Wilson, did any act or statement of the de-
fendant, Dr. Oldroyd, have the effect upon you 
to cause you to lose your love and affection for 
your husband or to lessen the love and affection 
for your husband? 
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Opposing counsel said: HW e object to that," and the 
court said: 
THE COURT: The court believes questions tn that 
form ought not to be asked (Tr. 356-7). 
After the court sustained the objection to the question ask-
ed, plaintiff's wife was asked why she left the plaintiff (Tr. 
303). 
The court excused the jury and suggested that we, out 
of the presence of the jury, ask the witness questions in order 
that the court might determine if that would be proper. The 
court observed (Tr. 303): 
UThe v1itness may ansv.re_r tha~ question, it being 
understood that the jury is out of the courtroom and 
that the witness is permitted to answer the question 
for the purpose of getting before the court whether 
the answer ~s objectionable or not." 
The witness answered: 
A. I left because I wasn't in love with Dale. I w~s 
sick and tired of him. I couldn't stand the sight of 
him. 
Motion to strike was made. Matter argued and the court 
stated (Tr. 304). 
THE COURT: You may ask some further questions 
of this witness, and indicate how far you wish to 
go. Let's see how far you expect to go. The wit-
ness will be permitted to answer, but it is under-
stood that the evidence will not go to the jury until 
the court has ruled on the pending objection. 
As disclosed by the record (Tr. -304-28 inclusive) de-
fendant was directed to ask questions of the witness in order 
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that the court might indicate how far we might go. ·The follow-
ing questions were asked of the witness: 
Q. When you were at public functions with Mr. Wil-
son, or at parties, or other places where other 
people were, how did he treat you: 
Objection was made and the court said: 
THE COURT: The court believes that if· that ques-
tion were· answered by the _witness reciting what he 
said to her at a dance or a show, or something of that 
sort, that that. would be a communication, even though 
it were in the presence of somebdy else (Tr. 306). 
The court further observed: ( ( . . . it would be the 
thought of the court that anything said by the husband to 
the wife would be a communication . . . " The court further 
volunteered the following observation: HTHE COURT: Coun-
sel would have the right to require you, before she goes on 
with any recital of what happened, to bring out the time and 
place (Tr. '3·07). 
The court requested that the last question asked be read 
again and then observed: THE COURT: The court believes 
.. that that is too general, and calls for a conclusion. It might 
be objectionable on those grounds (Tr. 307). 
The witness was asked with respect to a visit to her 
father's home in 1947 (Tr. 310) as follows: 
Q. Now, when you went to your father's in San Fran-
cisco, did you intend to come back? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why did you come back? 
A. I don't know whether I can testify to this or not. 
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Q. Well, did your father have anything to do with it? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Tell us about that. Why did you come back, with-
out relating the conversation. 
A. Well, I was reminded I had two children to raise, 
they came first, and it was suggested that I hide 
my feelings and try to make a go for the sake of 
the children, at least until they were of age. 
Q. Who made that suggestion? 
A. My father. 
Motion was made to strike on the ground that the answer 
was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, hearsay and 
privileged. Matter was argued. The court then said: 
THE COURT: Just a moment. Do you stand on your 
objection to that part as hearsay? 
Mr. Sherman Christenson: Yes; your Honor . 
. THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that would 
be objectionable as hearsay. She would not be per-
mitted to testify what her father said to her. Now, 
about this point of her intention, did you intend 
to go back and have that covered by your objection, 
Mr. Christenson ? · 
Mr. Sherman Christenson; On the ground, if the court 
please, as privileged. 
THE COURT: Any other objection to that? (Tr. 312. 
THE COURT: The court would· be inclined to permit 
the witness to state her intention at that 'time, but 
not to state what her father said or what other 
third parties said ( T r. 312) . 
The witness was asked: 
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Q. And what was your reason for going at that time? 
Objection was made upon the usual grounds as well as 
privilege and the court observ~d: 
THE COURT: It appears to the court that the question 
would be improper (Tr. 313). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. ·Did Dale come down to get you at that time, do you 
recall? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Did you tell him why you were coming back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you tell him? 
After objection the court obs~rved: 
THE COURT: I am inclined to think that would be 
improper to ask the witness (Tr. 313-4). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Why did you come back? 
THE COURT: I think that objection should be sus-
tained (Tr. 314). 
The court further observed with respect to the question 
just asked: 
THE COURT: What I mean, to call on the witness to 
state her motive for doing a given thing, I doubt 
would be relevant or competent under the general 
rules of evidence (Tr. 314). 
The court indicated its position with respect to the line 
of questions being asked in the record (Tr. 314-6) after which 
the court said: 
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THE COURT: You may answer that question yes or no. 
A. What was the question? You got me so confused 
I don't know (Tr. 316-7.) 
Q. Do you know what time I am talking about? 
A. This is May, 1950. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
A. Did I tell Dale why I was coming back at that time? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why did you tell him? What said said? What 
did you say to him ? 
A. I told him if our living conditions could be improv-
ed, if his atttuide toward me was different, that I 
would come back, and that I would try and make 
a home for him and the kids. 
Q. And did he say anything to that? 
A. He promised me faithfully that conditions all the 
way around would be better, I had nothing to 
worry about, that he would make an effort to im-
prove our living conditions, and the conditions 
under which I had been forced to live, that they 
would· be better. 
Q. And did you come back? 
Motion was made to strike both answers and the court said: 
THE COURT: The court believes that the objection 
should be sustained (Tr. 317). 
The witness was asked about a trip to California in 1947. 
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Q. At that ti1ne whether or not you had any love and 
affection for the plaintlf£. 
Objection was made on the ground that it called for a con-
clusion. It was incompetent, irrelevant· and immaterial, and 
the witness incompetent to testify. 
THE COURT: I think. that question would be leading 
· (Tr. 319). 
The witness was asked: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Wilson, can you detail for us the con-
dition with . respect to your social life during the 
. time you were in Payson? 
Af~er objection· made the court said: 
THE COURT: Without making any ruling on the ob-
jection I am going to let the witness answer that 
question and see what it develops (Tr. 320). 
A~ Yes, well, we belonged to a few clubs, we went 
out a good deal. We went to our friends' a good 
deal? 
Q. Any particular friends? 
· A. Yes, we used to spend quite a few evenings with 
the Harmers .. 
Q. How marty evenings would you say a week? 
A. Oh-
Q. On the average, during the years that you have 
vis ted them ? 
A. During the years that we were in Payson? 
Q. Yes, average· evenings a week during the years 
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A. Well, I would say two or three evenings a week. 
I didn't like to spend very many evenings with Dal~ 
alone. I didn't enjoy his company. 
After motion to strike the court observed: 
THE COURT: You will not be permitted to testify 
as to your li,~es and dislikes, but such matters, I 
believe, would be improper. When you are called 
upon to tell what you did, keep in mind what you 
did, rather than your thoughts (Tr. 320-21). 
The witness testified: 
Q. On these occasions, Mrs. Wilson, how did your 
husband treat you ? 
Objection was made and the court said: 
THE COURT: I think the general objection to that 
question would be good (Tr. 3·22). 
The witness was asked about her duties at the home and 
among other things testified that she had to do the housework, 
chop the kindling, get in the coal and said: 
Dale never made that any of his chores . . . I car-
ried water to wash ... and this was out in a little 
back porch with no heat. That is my washing room. 
I didn't even have running water out there. And any-
thing that was done around the house I had to do.· 
He never was interested in improving the place. 
After motion the court struck out as a conclusion the 
statement of the witness that her husband was never interested 
in improving the place (Tr. 323). 
The witness was asked: 
Q .Now, Mrs .Wilson, was there anything further 
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at this time that you can recall that he did or said 
that caused you unhappiness at that time? 
A. Well, he didn't do much of anything to make me 
happy (Tr. 325). 
Motion was made to strike the answer and the court 
observed: 
THE COURT: The court is of the opinion that answer 
like that should be stricken, and that if objection 
were made to a question like that it should be sus-
tained, on the ground that it is leading and sug-
gestive .. My thought is that you can ask the wit-
ness what he did. If the witness avoids reciting what 
she said and avoids telling anything that he did 
in confidential situations. In other words, she can't 
go on with a recital of what he did under confi-
dential .relationships, in the opinion of the court 
. (Tr. 325-6). 
The court further observed: 
THE COURT: If you want to ask the witness in plain 
terms, rrw hat were your feelings toward the plain-
tiff in May} 1947 or 1950", I am inclined to permit 
you to ask that question, and have it answered, but 
if you ask a question that would lead up to a 
recital of a lot of things, that would be objection-
able (Tr. 328). 
We submit that the court in holding that the witness 
might not testify that the plaintiff did.n' t do much of anything 
to make her happy committed error. 
How else can the conduct of a man be presented? If he 
never did anything to make her happy, what else can she say 
than he did nothing to make her happy? 
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The court threw a straight jacket around the efforts of 
the defendant to introduce testimony of plaintiffs wife _much 
tighter than Section 78-24-8 ( 1) U.C.A. 1953 authorizes. 
We submit that the court's refusal to permit plaintiff's 
wife to testify that the defendant never did or said anything 
to cause her to lose her love and affection for her husband was 
prejudicial error. 
Not only did the court deny our right to have the plain-
tiff's wife testify to matters that we think were not privileged 
but the court even suggested to plaintiff's counsel additional 
grounds for objection. 
Defendant offered to show what the testimony of plain-
tiff's wife_ would be to questions propounded to her and what 
her answers would be to questions propounded to her and what 
her answers would be if permitted to answer. These offers 
appear in the transcript between page 3 72 to 384. 
We offered to show that plaintiff's wife if asked the fol-
lowing questions would give the following answers: 
Q. Mrs. Wilson, during your married life and for the 
past several years, ~ave you and your husband had 
considerable trouble ? ( T r. 3 72) . 
Before the question was answered the court suggested 
that counsel make their objections whereupon the question was 
objected to on numerous grounds including that of privilege 
and the court said: 
THE COURT: Do you object to it on the further 
ground that it is leading? 
With which counsel agreed. 
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THE COURT: The court would be inclined to sustain 
the objection on the ground that it is leading, and 
that it is also in violation of the statute regarding 
the competency of. a former wife of a party (Tr. 
373). 
We offered to shoyv the answer that would be given by 
plaintiff's wife to the question asked as· follows: 
A. Yes, sir, from time to time we have .had trouble. 
We proposed to ask as the next question: 
Q. And when did that trouble begin? 
A. Well, I would say the first trouble we had was the 
first year of our married. life. 
Q. Now, have you left Dale at any time during your 
marriage before the time you left and went to Cali-
fornia-and didn't return? 
Her answer would be: 
A. The first time I left him. was about 1942, as I recol· 
· lect. 
Q. And at that time where did you go? 
And we offered to show that- the witness would testify 
if permitted to testify as set out at the transcript page 375. · 
We next proposed to ask the witness: 
Q. Did you make any statement to your grandmother? 
(Tr. 376). 
Counsel suggested that time and place be fixed and the 
·court observed: 
THE COURT: Even if the time and place ts fixed, 
isn't that hearsay? (Tr. 3 76). 
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We offered to show that her answer would be: 
A. I said to grandma: HI simply can't live under those 
conditions. I haven't any decent things to do with, 
I am living like a pioneer, and I can't do it (Tr. 
{376-7). 
We proposed to ask the further question: 
Q. Why did you return home? (Tr. 377). 
After counsel for plaintiff stated that there was no objec-
tion the court observed: 
THE COURT: Well, that question, tWhy did you re-
turn home?' If that is asked, and if there is objec-
tion made to it, I call your attention to the fact 
it opens up the door for miscellaneous statements, 
this puts me in the position of having to sustain the 
objection. 
We offered to show that the witness would have testified: 
A. And Dale came to. Provo and he said ((Geraldine, 
Bert has gone. Will you please come· back and try 
to get along and things will be different." I wasn't 
happy in ·Payson and Dale knew it. But neverthe-
less I went back, and I said CtO.K., I will try and 
do it again." (Tr. 3 78). · 
Objection was made on the grounds that it was a confi-
dential communication and the court observed: 
THE COURT: The court believes that the objection 
to that part of the indicated testimony, referring to 
what the plaintiff said, or w:hat his wife said on 
that occasion, should be sustained, and that the 
other should go in, if not objected to (Tr. 3 79). 
We proposed to ask the witness if her husbar:td ridiculed 
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her in public and after objection that it called for a conclusion 
the court observed: 
THE COURT: The court believes counsel should not 
be permitted to characterize the evidence, and that 
that would be characterization, to ask her what he 
said in public about her (Tr. 379). 
We proposed to ask the witness ~he question: 
Q. Now did you leave the plaintiff, Dale Berkeley Wil-
son, again? 
And the answer to that question would be that she went 
to California, left her husband and went to her father's home 
in California in 1947 (Tr. 380). 
We proposed to ask the witness the question: 
Q. Why did you return to Payson from California? 
Which her answer would be: 
A. My father kept encouraging me to come back. He 
said: C«Geraldine, you have got two children. You 
have got to consider your children first.. Go back 
and hide your feelings, and don't tell anyone." So 
I'd go back, and I'd put on a front. By that time 
I'd lost every bit of love I ever had for Dale (Tr. 
381-2) .. 
We proposed to ask the witness if she again returned to 
plaintiff to which her answer woul~ be yes (Tr. 382). 
The court gave a leading oar to counsel for defendant 
and said: 
THE COURT: If you strike the word C«again," you will 
be permitted to ask it. When you put in those as-
sumptions, if objection is made, the court feels 
it should be sustained (Tr. ·3·82). 
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We offered to show that the witness would answer: 
Yes, I came back and kept telling myself-
And the court directed that we must ask specific questions 
(Tr. 382). We proposed to ask the witness the following ques-
tion: 
Will you state, Mrs. \Vilson, how you felt toward 
your husband after you returned from California 
in 1947? 
We proposed to ask the folowing question: 
Will you tell the court what Dale's attitude was after 
you returned from California? (Tr. 383). 
To \vhich we would expect the witness to answer: 
Well, his attitude toward me was the same as it always . 
was. He never paid very much attention to me. I 
was there. He expected me to be there. I was just 
a convenience around the house, as far as Dale was 
concerned. He never showed any affection (Tr. 
(383-4). 
The court made the ·following observations: 
THE COURT: The court believes that the offer of the 
last question, if answered as just indicated, would 
be improper, and that the answer should be stricken 
upon motion. 
We submit that the court committed error in excluding 
testimony of plaintiff's former wife upon the ground of privi-
lege. We believe that the court's ruling and the statement of 
the court as to what we might elicit and what we could not 
examine her about constituted prejudicial error. The defend-
ant was entitled to show the conditions, relations, and the 
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treatment of plaintiff calculated to alienate her affections from 
her husband and to present to the jury the· true relationship 
between plaintiff and his former wife. 
We submit that the court strained the words and intent 
of the statute on privilege (Section 78-24-8 (1) U.C.A. 1953} 
by ~imiting the witness to testifying to only whether or not 
on a given date she had affection for her husband. Without 
supplying dressing fot her answe~, the witness was limited to 
the colorless word no or yes to be contrasted with the volumes 
of pantomime with which plaintiff filled the record over our 
objection. The defendant was grossly prejudiced. 
The court put in the dams to prevent plalntiff' s wife 
showing the conditions under which they lived and. how plain-
tiff treated his wife and pulled out. the gates ·for plaintiff to 
go the limit. 
We submit that the rule of privilege cannot be applied 
as the court applied it without doing violence to the statute. 
This court in Re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah, 456, 261 Pac. 
page 15 at page 492 stated: 
((Although the statute does not use the term 'con-
fidential cotnmunication · as do the statutes of son1e 
of the states, nevertheless, in view of the disclosed pol-
. icy and reasons for the statutes, we are of the opinion 
the communication or knowledge imparted must be 
such as pertains to the confidence of the marriage 
relation." 
In that case this court quoted from Beyerline v. State, 147 
, Ind. 125, 45 N.E. 772, page 491, as follows: 
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Hit is not every conversation between husband and 
\vife, nor every word or act said or done by either in 
the presence of the other, that is protected under the 
seal of secrecy, but only such communications, whether 
by word or deed, as pass from one to the other by virtue 
of the confidence resulting from their intimate relations 
with one another. Where the criminal, in seeking 
advice and consolation, lays open his heart to his wife, 
the law regards the sacredness of their relation, and 
will not permit her to make known what he has thus 
communicated, even as it will not ask him· to disclose 
it himself. But if what is said or done by either has no 
relation to their mutual trust and confidence as husband 
and wife, then the reason for secrecy ceases." 
The court in that case quoted the following language from 
40 Cyc. at page 491: 
C<The rule as to privileged communications does not. 
preclude evidence by one spouse as to the personal in-
jury or violence inflicted upon him or her by the other, 
or as to ill treatment to which he or she was subjected 
by the other spouse.'.' 
This court in the case of in Re Estate of Van Alstine, 26 
Utah 193; 72 Pac. 962, at page 202, U. R. uses the following 
language: 
CtWhile the exclusion of confidential communications 
between husband and wife is supported by public pol-
icy, there is no reason why the surviving wife or hus-
band should be excluded from· testifying, in the main-
tenance of legal rights, to non-confidential communi-
cations, and to any facts the knowledge of which was 
not acquired in confidence- through the marriage rela-
tion. In the light of the reason of the exclusion, and 
in view .of the authorities upon the subject, the pro-. 
visions of the statute in question were intended to 
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exclude only confidential communications. Knowledge 
of the deceased husband's habits and mental conditions 
was obtained by his wife by observation, and not from 
anything communicated to her in confidence by her 
husband. The contention of the proponent under con-
sideration is therefore untenable." 
We submit that the court exclusion of the testimony offered 
as to the treatment to which plaintiff's wife was subjected by 
plaintiff was prejudicial error. The testimony of plaintiff's wife 
sets out the kind of treatment which she sustained at his 
hands. The things he did which most necessarily have resuited 
in her loss of love and affection; the things that h~ failed to 
do that a considerate husband would have done was all proper 
matter to be presented to the jury .. 
(b) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE TESTI-
MONY. GIVEN BY PLAINTIFF'S WIFE IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE DIVORCE ACTION AND AT THE 
TAKING OF HER DEPOSITION. 
The testimony of plaintiff'·s wife given in connection with 
the divorce case and in his presence was ·offered for the purpose 
of discrediting the allegations ·in plaintiff's complaint that he 
and his wife lived together happily until the affections of his 
wife were alienated by the defendant, and that during the 
period named in the complaint, October 15, 1950. to October 
2, 1951, defendant alienated the affection of plaintiff's wife 
and likewise to discredit plaintiff's testimony while on the 
stand that he and his wife were very happy and up to the 
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It is our position that any admission or statement made by 
plaintiff's \vife evidencing her lack of affection for her husband 
or detailing the unfavorable conditions under which plaintiff 
and his wife lived \vere facts which the jury might consider 
to determine if plaintiff himself had reasons to disbelieve 
'"hat he testified to. The jury was entitled to know from the 
testimony and admission of plaintiff's wife whether or not 
the conditions v.'ere as claimed by plaintiff or if his treatment 
of her did not alienate her affection and minimize the damages 
to which plaintiff was entitled. 
The following questions were asked the plaintiff: 
Q. Is it not a fact? Did you hear your wife testify in 
the divorce action ? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you hear your wife say that she had had trouble 
from time to time snice the first year of your mar-
riage (Tr. 159). 
Objection was made to the questions and the court ex-
cused the jury while the matter was considered. 
The court took the position that the testimony given by 
plaintiff's wife in taking he~ deposition in August, 1951 and 
at the trial -of the divorce case in October, 1951 was hearsay 
(Tr. 160). The further objection was made that the testimony 
of plaintiff's wife should not be offered because it was in at-
tempt to get before the jury evidence which we would not be 
permitted to offer if she were on the stand (Tr. 161). 
Defendant's position with respect to such testimony was 
that it was a declaration made by plaintiff's wife and within 
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plaintiff's hearing and that it was proper for the purpose of 
showing the state of plaintiff's wife's feelings and the con-
dition under which she lived. Defendant further contends that 
as impeachmen~ of plaintiff it was proper. Plaintiff had built 
his. entire case on the proposition that he and his wife lived 
happily together; that they enjoyed perfect companionship; 
that they spent four or five nights a week· with mutual friends; 
and that he thought she was extremely happy with him. The 
testimony of his wife was therefore competent when offered 
in his· presence for the purpose of impeaching his ·recital as 
to how he and his wife lived. 
Defendant was not permitted to show that plaintiff had 
heard from the lips of his wife testimony which would im-
peach the ·testimony he had given. Upon that theory de~enda.nt 
contended that the testimony was proper for the purpose of 
discrediting his ba~d declaration as to his wife's happiness. 
The court stated: ((The court believes that the evidence attempt-
ed to be brought in by this line of testimony, inquiring as to 
whether the plaintiff knows his wife testified to such and such 
a thing at a hearing in August, 1951 would be clearly objec-
tionable as hearsay. . . . I think that it is an insurmountable 
objection, I can't see any exceptions that would allow you 
to bring in t~at hearsay testimony, and those statements made 
by the wife, whether under oath or not, that is still hearsay. 
You have to call the witness, so that the witness may be cross-
examined. I think the hearsay rule would forbid you to go into 
this whole line of testimony as to what his wife testified on 
that date." (Tr. 162). 
We do not believe that the objection of hearsay can 
76 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be directed against the testimony offered to discredit plaintiff's 
testimony. 
The testimony was not offered for the purpose· of establish-
ing the facts testified to but for the purpose of showing that 
plaintiff had heard from his wife's own lips statements dis-
crediting his claims that she was happy. Suppose plaintiff had 
testified that he never said an unkind word to his' wife; that 
he and his wife never talked about getting a divorce; that 
his wife was never unhappy. Would defendant not be en 
titled to show that plaintiff's wife stated to a friend that she 
was unhappy, that she and plaintiff did nothing but quarrel 
and fight; that she had left him three times with the intention 
of getting a divorce? 
Plaintiff's testimony ·is a declaration of his conclusion of 
how his wife felt. Is not her statement to a friend that she 
felt differently than plaintiff testified to permissible for the 
purpose of impeaching plaintiff's testimony? It is our position 
that plaintiff could not consistently contend that his wife's 
feelings and her satisfaction t~:bout the home were as he stated, 
when prior to the time of making those statements he . had 
.heard ~er describe the conditions as being different from what 
he had stated. The jury might still have believed the testimony 
of plaintiff but the jury was entitled to know that when plain-
tiff made the statements he had heard the testimony from his 
wife-statments made by her that did not square with his 
testimony. 
We, therefore, believe that the court committed error in 
refusing to permit us to ask the plaintiff if he heard his wife 
make the statements contained in her testimony at the taking · 
77 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the deposition and at the trial of the divorce case which 
statements are set out in the transcript pp. 167-183· inclusive. 
We shall call the court's attention to only a small portion 
of the testimony set out in the transcript and which we asked 
the court may offer of proof to .Permit us to sh0w that plain-
tiff heard her give. 
Plaintiff's wife testified: 
t t • • • I had no facilities. I was ·carrying water to fill 
my washer. I was using an old washer. I was carrying 
in coal. I was cutting my own kindling, and trying 
to keep it all up ... (Tr. 168). · 
tt ••• The house was run down. The door knob on 
the back door was off for months and months and 
months for want of a little screw. Every time he'd open 
the door, the door knob would come out. The grass 
would grow, and unless I would go out and cut it, it 
wasn't cut . . . but if Dale got out to cut· the lawn, 
he'd usually stop and talk with anyone that came along. 
It was usually too late then ... "(Tr. 174-5). 
u ••• I hated to have my friends come to see where 
I lived. It embarrassed me when my people came. It 
embarrassed my people to come and see where I was 
living. I have a lot of girl friends over in Payson. I'd 
say (come and see me,' and then I'd hope like the 
dickens that they'd never come." (Tr. 176). 
( ( . . . Everytime I left, even to go to Salt Lake, 
I-I dreaded going back to Payson. . . When I went 
to California I thought ]f I could only stay.' My 
father kept encouraging me to come back. He said, 
(Geraldine, you have got two children. You have got 
to consider your· children first. Go back and hide your 
feelings, and don't tell anyone.' So I'd go back, and 
I'd put on ·a front. By that time I'd lost every bit of 
love I ever had for Dale." (Tr. 176-7). 
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t(A. I came back and kept telling myself that perhaps 
if I kept telling him that I love him, maybe I myself 
'\\·ill start believing it, but l couldn't. It was an effort 
for me to even put my arms around him. I got to the 
place \vhere I'd-· I even lost my respect for him .· . . " 
(Tr. 177-8). 
tt • • • He used to make fun, say (Mama is stupid. 
She can't do this, she can't do that.' He was always 
belittling me, and telling me that I couldn't do things." 
(Tr. 179). 
tt ••• He didn't seem to appreciate anything I ever 
did. He never made any comments about what had 
been done ... " (Tr.· 179). 
HI couldn't say Dale was a drinking man. No, but 
he liked to drink with the boys. The boys would come 
and he'd have one, and always when he'd get one, 
he was belligerent. That was when he was belittling 
me and calling me down." (Tr. 182). 
Plaintiff's wife testified on August 4, 1951, as follows: 
A. The second time is when my grandmother broke her 
hip and I went down to take care of her. I told my 
father at that time that I was very unhappy and that 
I didn't want to go back. 
Q. When was that, do you recall? 
A. I believe approximately it. was 1947, I wouldn't be 
sure of the year. 
Q. But you didn't tell Dale anything about it? 
A. Dale knew I was unhappy, we had discussed the 
matter from time to time. (Tr. 183). 
We submit that the defendant was entitled to ask the 
plaintiff if he heard his wife make the statements shown by 
the evidence offered. 
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We did not ask plaintiff if the statements made by his wife 
were true-but if he 'heard her testify as shown. 
If he didn't hear her testify it would have been hearsay 
as to plaintiff. But statements of plaintiff's wife were not hear-
say. if made in his presence and heard by him. 
In view that plaintiff was advising the jury how happy 
his wife wasJ any statement made by his wife inconsistent with 
his testimony is proper to impeach his testimony. 
In re ·Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193 72 Pac. 962, 
our Supreme Court at p. 202 (26 U) quoted approvingly the 
. following language: 
((Fron1 these decisions it is fairly deducible that a 
widow or divorced wife is competent to testify to any 
facts or acts occurring during the married life which 
did not come to her knowledge in confidence growing 
out of the marital relation, although they may tend to 
show the husband had committed a fraud, or to discredit 
him as a witness} or indirectly to show th~t he had been 
guilty of a crime." 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this care ·warrants no judgment at all 
in favor of the plaintiff. The excessive verdict returned by 
the jury is based upon passion and prejudice, engendered by 
the attitude of the Court, the ruling of the Court on evidence 
and the instructions of the Court to the jury. A reduced ver-
dict in this case would not meet the ends of justice. A com-
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plete reversal is fully justified on the basis heretofore set forth 
in this brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE W. WORTHEN 
ARNOLD ROYLANCE 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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